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1 An illustrative list of such measures is provided for in footnote 4 to Art. 11 of the Safeguards 
Agreement, and includes “export moderation, export-price or import-price monitoring systems, 
export or import surveillance, compulsory import cartels and discretionary export or import licens-
ing schemes, any of which afford protection”.
2 See P. Hilpold, ‘Die Neuregelung der Schutzmaßnahmen im GATT/WTO-Recht und ihr Einfluß 
auf “Grauzonenmaßnahmen’, 55 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1995, 
p. 89 ff., at p. 124, with reference to the necessity to render formal safeguard measures an attractive 
alternative to grey area measures.
3 Negotiating Group on Safeguards, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/21, 31 October 1998, p. 20.
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1. Introduction
As is made clear from the preamble of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards (here-
inafter AS) – which includes the objective “[…] to re-establish multilateral control 
over safeguards and eliminate measures that escape such control […]” – the ban 
on any kind of export-restraint agreements1 and the revitalization of the safeguard 
clause were the two axes along which the strategy of re-incorporation of the so-
called “grey area” measures within the multilateral discipline of international 
trade were to take place.
The ban enshrined in Art. 11.1.b) was in itself necessary to realign the practice of 
trade protection measures adopted by WTO Member States to conform with the 
fundamental principles on which the GATT/WTO is based, principles that had 
been violated for decades by the proliferation of VERs (unilateral private or public 
voluntary export restraints), VRAs (intergovernmental bilateral voluntary restraint 
agreements) and OMAs (multilateral orderly market arrangements). However, the 
proliferation of grey area measures – a category which in principle includes any 
restriction on exports administered unilaterally by the exporters and/or their gov-
ernment, but induced by the importers and/or their government – is historically 
due not only to the absence of a specific discipline under GATT 1947 but also to the 
existence of incentives and practical conveniences (starting with the possibility to 
avoid the high costs of activating the “official” safeguard clause provided for by 
Art. XIX GATT),2 that have rendered VERs a more attractive option for govern-
ments pressurized by domestic industries in search of commercial protection. In 
sum, as has long been recognized in GATT documents,3 the solution to the prob-
lem of grey area measures did not lie with simply outlawing such measures.
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4 As is well-known, the only measure maintained in effect beyond 31 December 1998, and until 
31 December 1999, has been the “Elements of Consensus” between the EC and Japan, as reflected 
in the annex to the Agreement on Safeguards (see footnote 5 with reference to Art. 11). This was a 
bilateral, informal arrangement concluded in July 1991 that placed quotas on Japanese motor vehicle 
exports to the EC as a whole and to five specific EC Member States.
5 Committee on Safeguards, Minutes of the Meeting Held on 9 November 2000, G/SG/M/16, 
18 January 2001, para. 103; Committee on Safeguards, Report (2000), G/L/409, 23 November 2000, sec. IV.
6 At the end of 2009, it was calculated that the overall share of trade affected by new trade-
restricting or distorting measures that had been introduced since October 2008 remained small, 
approximately 1% of world merchandise trade (see Overview of the Developments in the International 
Trading Environment, Annual Report by the Director General, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/OV/12, 
18 November 2009, pp. A3-A4). In the period between mid-October 2010 and mid-October 2011, new 
restrictive measures covered around 0.9% of world imports, less than recorded in the previous year 
(see Overview of the Developments in the International Trading Environment, Annual Report by the 
Director-General, WT/TPR/OV/14, 21 November 2011, p. 3). Along the same lines, in the legal scholar-
ship, see B. Ruddy, The Critical Success of the WTO: Trade Policies of the Current Economic Crisis, 13 
Journal of International Economic Law 2010, pp. 475 ff., according to whom the WTO “has passed the 
‘stress test’ of this current economic crisis”, in the sense that despite strong protectionist pressures, 
WTO Members have not made recourse to broad protectionist policies such as those of the 1930s 
(p. 489).
7 Y.-S. Lee, ‘Revival of Grey-Area Measures? The US-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement: 
Conflict with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards’, 36 Journal of World Trade 2002, p. 155. See also 
M. Beise, Th. Oppermann, G. Sander, Grauzonen im Welthandel. Protektionismus unter dem alten 
GATT als Herausforderung an die neue WTO (Baden-Baden, 1998), p. 138, who reported that in 1997 
the European Community and Norway concluded the Lachs Compromise, according to which 
Norway pledged to reduce, as from 1 July 1997 and for five years, its exports of salmon in the EC coun-
tries. The objective was to the provide protection to the fisheries industries in Scotland and Ireland.
In 2000 – after the expiry of the residual 1-year period granted under Art. 11.2 AS 
to phase out or bring into conformity with the Agreement on Safeguards one spe-
cific measure4 per importing Member (once the deadline to phase out or bring 
into conformity all other measures in existence on 1 January 1995, had already 
expired on 31 December 1998) – the WTO Committee on Safeguards noted that all 
notified measures were definitively phased out by 1 January 2000.5
Independently of the official WTO sources – which, even in these years of 
financial turmoil and consequent fears of protectionist outbursts, were inclined to 
portray a fairly reassuring picture6 – rumours of a “revival” of grey area measures 
have spread in the legal scholarship.7
The purpose of this work, therefore, is to try to assess how the dual strategy that 
aimed to eliminate “grey area” measures has worked out in practice, also in the 
light of the protectionist pressures unleashed by the current economic crisis. For 
this purpose, after providing a brief overview of the historic proliferation of these 
measures (paragraph 2), we will proceed to ask whether the attempt to render 
ordinary safeguard measures a more attractive alternative to VRAs has worked in 
practice (paragraph 3), and then analyse some of the intrinsic and extrinsic weak-
nesses of the ban itself (paragraph 4). We will then go on to review some cases of 
export-restraint agreements arguably falling within the exceptions to the ban 
enshrined in Art. 11.1.c) AS (paragraphs 5, 6, and 7), reaching the conclusion that 
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8 See, for instance, “Grey-Area Measures”, Background Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/
NG9/W/6, 16 September 1987.
9 E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Grey Area Trade Restrictions and International Law’, in D. Dicke, E.-U. 
Petersmann (eds.), Foreign Trade in the Present and a New International Economic Order (Fribourg, 
1988), p. 203.
10 Idem., Grey Area Trade Policy and the Rule of Law, 22 Journal of World Trade 1988, p. 25 ff., at p. 
30 ff.; J. Jackson, Consistency of Export Restraints with the GATT, 11 The World Economy 1988, p. 485 ff.
11 See, in this sense, B. Hindlay, ‘Voluntary Export Restraints and the GATT’s Main Escape Clause’, 
3 World Economy 1980, pp. 313 ff., at p. 326 ff.; M. Tatsuta, ‘Voluntary Export Restraints – Implementation 
and Implications’, 49 Rabels Zeitschrift 1985, pp. 328 ff.; I. Bernier, ‘Les ententes de restriction volon-
taire à l’exportation en droit international économique’, 11 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 
1973, p. 48 ff, at p. 79 ff.; M.W. Lochmann, ‘The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports: 
An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of GATT and the Free Trade Market Principles of 
United States Antitrust Law’, 27 Harvard International Law Journal 1986, p. 99 ff., at p. 120; P. Wang, 
‘The Japanese Automotive Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements and International Law’, 23 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1985, p. 297 ff., at p. 304 ff.
12 See E.-U. Petersmann, Grey Area Trade Policy, quoted above, pp. 31 and p. 43; R. Quick, 
Exportselbstbeschränkungen und Artikel XIX GATT (Köln, 1983), p. 268, and H. Moinuddin, ‘Grey Area 
Trade Policies’, in D. Dicke and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Foreign Trade, quoted above, p. 197 ff., p. 205.
some of these agreements are WTO-inconsistent. Some brief remarks of a more 
general character will conclude this work (paragraph 8).
2. A Short Overview of the Phenomenon  
of Export-Restraint Agreements
The legal and economic analysis of “grey area” measures – a scholarly endeavour 
to which Prof. Petersmann has offered some seminal contributions – has been car-
ried out in several GATT documents8 and legal commentaries over the years, and 
need therefore be only briefly summarized here.
Export-restraint agreements have represented “economically the most distor-
tive and politically the most dangerous form of protectionism”.9 Legally speaking, 
they were at odds with several general principles of the GATT system. By imposing 
discriminatory and non-transparent export restrictions on selected products 
(in the form of quantitative restrictions, price undertakings, surveillance systems, 
export forecasts etc.) aimed at protecting the domestic market of the importing 
country, “grey area” measures simultaneously contravened the GATT prohibitions 
of quantitative restrictions (Art. XI), of their discriminatory administration (Art. 
XIII), and the requirement of transparency (Art. X).10 At the same time, these mea-
sures were not justified by Art. XIX – the main “escape clause” provided for by 
GATT in order to protect, given certain conditions, domestic producers from 
import surges – at least because ordinary safeguard measures need to be applied 
in a non-discriminatory way.11 Moreover, according to the prevailing view,12 the 
agreements in question, being inter se agreements concluded at variance with 
multilateral discipline, were unlawful under Art. 41.1.b) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. In fact, being in contrast with several key principles of the 
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13 Thus E.M. Hizon, ‘The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde of Trade 
Protection’, 15 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1994, p. 105 ff., at p. 138.
14 M. Bronckers, ‘Voluntary Export Restraints and the GATT 1994 Agreement on Safeguards’, in 
J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, E. Gippini Fournier (eds.), The Uruguay Round Results. A European Lawyer’s 
Perspective (Brussels, 1995), p. 279.
15 “… the diversion to bilateralism may be attributed precisely to the failure of the escape clause 
to provide a viable option”, thus Hizon, supra note 13, p. 115. According to J.F. Perez-Lopez, ‘GATT 
Safeguards: A Critical Review of Article XIX and Its Implementation in Selected Countries’, 23 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1991, pp. 517 ff., at p. 533, VRAs might be taken as “prima 
facie evidence of the failure of Article XIX”.
GATT, they were at least incompatible with the realization of the object and pur-
pose of the treaty as a whole, as well as possibly damaging the rights of other 
contracting parties. And therefore illegal, but – it must be added – valid, since the 
peremptory nature of rules could hardly be sustained when departure from them 
had been widely practiced and tolerated. In this regard, suffice it to recall that 
from 1974 to 1994 the Multifibre Agreement was operating under the auspices of 
GATT 1947, and that its Article 4 openly allowed its contracting parties to enter 
into agreements restricting exports.
Today, the ban contained in Art. 11.1.b) AS, whereby “…a Member shall not seek, 
take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly market arrangements or 
any other similar measure on the export or the import side”, coupled with the 
phasing out of existing measures, seems therefore to have re-established the 
respect among Member States for the basic principles underpinning the multilat-
eral trade system.
All’s well that ends well? Apparently.
Some of the comments published immediately after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round were rather sceptical about the potential effectiveness of the ban: 
only “a sea-change in the mindset of the GATT Member States”13 could guarantee 
the solution of the VERs problem under the new regime. According to others: 
“symptoms rather than causes have been cured”.14
Leaving aside the less confessable motives which spurred the popularity 
of VRAs (eg, bypassing parliamentary and judicial controls, entering into secret 
or non-binding governmental arrangements), the crux of the matter – as 
mentioned – is the greater practical convenience that characterized the measures 
under consideration with respect to official trade remedies offered by the GATT 
system15 (especially “exceptional” safeguard measures designed to limit imports 
temporarily, measures not involving as a precondition unfair or illegal trade prac-
tices which distort competition, such as subsidies or dumping).
Export-restraint agreements were simply less costly for both sides; sometimes 
they turned out to be even profitable for them. The importing country could offer 
protection to domestic producers incapable of meeting international competition 
without, for example, having to provide proof of the presence of the complicated 
conditions required by GATT Art. XIX (unforeseen developments, serious injury or 
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16 This principle is not actually provided by GATT Art. XIX, but is derived from other provisions 
of the General Agreement, by the decisions of panels under the GATT 1947, and is now codified by 
Art. 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
17 See OECD, Competition and Trade Policies: Their Interaction, (Paris, 1984), p. 12. To limit our-
selves to one example, Lochmann, supra note 11, pointed out that the export-restraint agreement 
concluded in 1981 between Japan and the United States on automobiles “raised prices for new cars by 
an extra 400 dollars per auto” (p. 112).
threat thereof etc.), at a lower cost than it would pay activating the formal safe-
guard mechanism. In the latter case, in fact, the importing State is required to 
apply the measure chosen in respect of all the suppliers of the goods affected 
(regardless of their nationality), in compliance with the principle of the most (dis)
favoured nation.16 The lack of selectivity of authorized safeguard measures, result-
ing in a disproportion to the objective pursued (which is, usually, to limit exports 
from one country, or otherwise from a restricted number of States), multiplies the 
overall effect of trade restriction. Moreover, if all the countries acting as suppliers 
of that product are affected, the importing country has to negotiate compensation 
or suffer retaliation from all of them. This mechanism, which increases the cost of 
protection and the ensuing trade restriction, was, however, avoided through the 
conclusion of a bilateral, selective export-restraint agreement.
In turn, the exporting country found it convenient to acquiesce to the pressure 
exercised by the importing country (usually threatening the activation of trade 
defence measures or the adoption of protectionist legislation). While, in fact, the 
management of safeguard measures is entrusted to the authorities of the import-
ing State, the administration of the quotas (or other types of measures) agreed 
through export-restraint arrangements is entrusted to the authorities of the 
exporting country. For them, or for their domestic producers, the decline in 
exports provides an in-built element of compensation, since they capture the 
“scarcity rents” which follow the artificial restriction on the supply of the product 
on the market of the importing country, producing an increase in the prices of the 
exported good. In addition, the agreements in question are usually the outcome of 
a negotiation, which avoids the imposition of duties or other restrictive measures 
by the importing country, an event that almost always produces more damage in 
terms of reduced quantities or higher prices of exported goods.
Obviously, such benefits have a cost in economic and commercial terms (their 
unlawfulness has already been mentioned). The agreements in question, in fact, 
are the vehicle of covert trade restrictions; they distort an efficient allocation of 
the factors of production both internally and internationally (to an extent, how-
ever, that decreases with the increase of the comparative advantage enjoyed by 
the exporter, and high comparative advantages are usually the premise of the use 
of the measures at issue here); they create a surplus price paid by consumers in 
the protected markets17 (but also erga omnes safeguards produce the same effect, 
and perhaps even on a bigger scale), and introduce en element of discrimination 
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18 G. Burdeau, Les engagements d’autolimitation et l’évolution du commerce international, 37 
Annuaire français de droit international 1991, p. 748 ff.
19 See P. van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 2ed., (Cambridge, 
2008), p. 672.
20 GATT, Council Overview of Developments in International Trade and the Trading System, Annual 
Report by the Director General, C/RM/OV/1, 12 April 1991, p. 8.
21 D. Kitt, ‘What’s Wrong with Volunteering? The Futility of the WTO’s Ban on Voluntary Export 
Restraints’, 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 2009, p. 359 ff., at p. 384.
22 See, among many other works, E.-U. Petersmann, ‘The WTO Constitution and Human Rights’, 3 
Journal of International Economic Law 2000, p. 19 ff.; idem., ‘Human Rights and International 
Economic Law in the 21st Century: The Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships’, 4 Journal of 
International Economic Law 2001, p. 3 ff.
23 F. Capotorti, ‘L’extinction et la suspension des traités’, 134 Recueil des Cours 1971-III, p. 504.
to the detriment of developing countries. Historically, then, these agreements 
tend to proliferate, because the restriction of exports from country A creates space 
in the importing country for products from country B. This can encourage the con-
clusion of another export-restraint arrangement with country B. Meanwhile, the 
goods of country A are usually diverted to the markets of other countries. These 
latter may, in turn, come to be in a situation of surplus and then press to conclude 
a new export-restraint agreement.
Be that as it may, “grey area” measures ended up being less costly than formal 
safeguard measures, and very effective in avoiding trade wars.18 Furthermore, the 
tendency to operate for extended periods has also traditionally characterized uni-
lateral safeguard measures, for which Art. XIX of GATT 1947 did not set a maxi-
mum duration (in contrast to what happens today, pursuant to Art. 7 AS).
Available data demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the formal mechanism of 
trade protection. In the nearly fifty years during which GATT 1947 has been 
in  place, its Members have notified an average of only three formal measures 
per year (about 150 in total).19 In early 1991, 24 formal safeguard measures were 
in place, while almost 300 agreements containing grey area measures were in 
effect,20 not counting the measures kept secret, and the entire field of textile and 
clothing that, since 1974, was regulated – as mentioned – through the Multifibre 
Agreement.
The (persisting) greater efficiency of grey area measures with respect to the for-
mal safeguard mechanism has recently led some authors to propose their legaliza-
tion under the WTO.21 From a Law-and-Economics perspective, on the other hand, 
an agreement restricting export may well represent an efficient breach of the rela-
tive prohibition: selective, fast, automatically compensating (and politically valu-
able). In contrast, of course, with the pacta sunt servanda principle, with several 
key principles of the WTO system and the opinions of those – like the author hon-
oured in this Festschrift22 – who maintain the inherently constitutional nature of 
multilateral trade rules, but, on the other hand, perfectly in line with the principle 
of the general validity of inter se agreements,23 and the views of those who doubt 
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24 J. Pauwelyn, Conflicts of Norms in Public International Law. How WTO Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge, 2003), p. 315.
that the WTO has become something ontologically different from the GATT à la 
carte.24
3. The Attempt to Revitalize the Safeguard Measures: A Failure So Far?
As mentioned above, the apparent ineffectiveness of the safeguard mechanism 
provided for by Art. XIX GATT was one of the main causes behind the proliferation 
of “grey area” measures. Accordingly, the revitalization of this instrument repre-
sents a key factor in making the current ban on these measures really effective.
Two innovations introduced by the Agreement on safeguards, in particular, aim 
to restore the effective functioning of the safeguard clause. Both are intended to 
remedy the high cost of its activation, arising from the obligation to apply it on an 
MFN basis.
In the first instance – accepting proposals made by some of the participants in 
the Uruguay Round (in particular by the European Union) – an element of flexibil-
ity in the application of safeguard measures has been introduced. Although the 
principle of non-discriminatory application of safeguards has been reiterated 
(Art. 2.2), and provided that the chosen form of protection does not consist in an 
increase in tariffs, today the State in need of protection from imports, is in fact, 
enabled to graduate the quantum between countries suppliers of the product. 
More specifically, if the exports from some Member parties have increased more 
than proportionally with respect to the total increase of imports of that product, 
then – pursuant to Art. 5.2.b) AS – it is possible to depart from the general rules on 
the allocation of quotas, “hitting harder” the State whose exports have been the 
most damaging.
Secondly, notwithstanding the option for exporting countries affected by safe-
guard measures to activate retaliatory measures (if no compensation is agreed 
upon), the right to suspend substantially equivalent concessions may not be exer-
cised in the first three years of validity of a safeguard measure (Art. 8.3 AS). This is 
valid provided that the measure has been taken as a result of an absolute (not rela-
tive) increase in imports, and that it is compliant with the Agreement. In short, for 
three years safeguards have no cost, except for a compensation that the importing 
country negotiates from a position of strength.
Has the attempt to render the use of the safeguard clause more attractive been 
working in practice, especially in the light of the protectionists pressures unleashed 
by the financial crisis? In this regard, two clearly detectable trends confront each 
other: on the one hand, both the number of trade remedy investigations and the 
proportion of initiations that lead to definitive measures have been declining 
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25 Overview of the Developments in the International Trading Environment, Annual Report by the 
Director-General, WT/TPR/OV/14, 21 November 2011, p. 23 ff.
26 Ibid, pp. 17 and 23.
27 A.O. Sykes, ‘The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons From the Steel Dispute’, 7 Journal of 
International Economic Law 2004, p. 523 ff. In the same vein, see also R. Bhala and D. Gantz, ‘WTO 
Case Review 2001’, 19 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 2002, p. 457 ff., at p. 630, and 
J.R. Schick, ‘Agreement on Safeguards: Realistic Tools for Protecting Domestic Industry or 
Protectionist Measures?’, 27 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 2003, p. 153 ff.
28 C. Stevenson, ‘Are World Trade Organization Members Correctly Applying World Trade 
Organization Rules in Safeguard Determinations?’, 38 Journal of World Trade 2004, p. 307 ff.
29 Y. Guochua, ‘Are Safeguard Measures Permitted Under the World Trade Organization System?’, 
17 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 2003, p. 175 ff.
30 See the Appellate Body’s assessment in Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, 14 December 1999, para. 86 (“the text of Article XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT 1994, read in its ordinary meaning and in its context, demonstrates that safeguard mea-
sures were intended by the drafters of the GATT to be matters out of the ordinary, to be matters of 
urgency, to be, in short, “emergency actions””).
since the 2008.25 Within trade remedies, as usual, anti-dumping measures, firstly, 
and then countervailing duties got the lion’s share compared with safeguards. On 
the other hand, an upward trend in the implementation of new export restrictions 
(affecting mainly certain raw materials and minerals and food products) has been 
registered, especially in the period between October 2010 and October 2011.26
More generally speaking, the judgment given by several authors on the func-
tioning of the safeguard mechanism under the WTO is far from encouraging. As 
has been observed, “insurmountable hurdles to the legal use of safeguard mea-
sures”27 persist. Noting the impressive record of condemnations inflicted by the 
WTO dispute settlement organs in respect of the States resorting to safeguard 
measures (since they usually do not meet the standard of review of at least one of 
the legal requirements),28 it has even been argued that these measures would be 
permitted only in theory.29
The cause of these obstacles – in addition to definition gaps still existing in the 
current normative text – is mainly attributed to the overly restrictive attitude 
taken by the WTO dispute settlement bodies in interpreting and applying the pro-
visions of the Agreement on Safeguards. An attitude probably justified by the fear 
of abuse that leads to admitting the use of safeguard measures only in emergency 
situations (as is made clear by the WTO case-law,30 and by the very title of Art. XIX 
GATT “Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products”). After all, the GATT 
system has always looked to safeguard measures with a certain “sense of guilt”. 
This largely derives from the circumstance that safeguards are designed to tempo-
rarily protect domestic industries affected by economic difficulties, since they are 
not able to withstand the impact of more competitive imports. From the point of 
view of a free trade system, however, these difficulties are the virtuous effect pro-
duced by the proper functioning of the system itself. They, in fact, indicate a trans-
fer of comparative advantages to more efficient foreign industries that produce at 
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31 Ibid., para. 77 (“any safeguard measure imposed after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement 
must comply with the provisions of both the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 
1994”).
32 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/
AB/R, 14 December 1999, para. 83.
33 Ibid., para. 131.
lower costs (for reasons not always commendable, sometimes associated with 
lower standards of social protection). Compared with trade defence measures 
(anti-dumping or countervailing duties), which are directed against unfair or ille-
gal practices, safeguard measures are then inevitably experienced by the multilat-
eral trading system with a certain suspicion, because they represent a contradiction, 
which is tolerated mainly to allow States to offset the gradual removal of trade 
barriers with domestic interests.
The strict attitude taken by WTO dispute settlement bodies is notoriously 
reflected in the solution adopted by the Appellate Body regarding the relationship 
between Art. XIX GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards (in Korea – Dairy 
Product,31 and then in Argentina – Footwear).32 According to this case-law, indeed, 
the factual and legal requirements provided by both sources have to be applied 
cumulatively, which means that the importing State may be called to prove that 
the serious injury (actual or threatened) suffered from domestic producers 
because of a high increase in imports depends on two conditions (“unforeseen 
developments” and obligations undertaken by virtue of the participation in the 
GATT), which are provided for only by Art. XIX GATT, while the Agreement on 
safeguards does not mention them. The reintroduction by the Appellate Body of 
the “unforeseen developments” requirement creates further problems in the 
absence of a detailed regulation: it is not clear, for example, what the “critical date” 
is on the basis of which one must consider whether or not the developments were 
unexpected. And no less interpretative difficulties are created by other require-
ments imposed by the Agreement in question. What exactly does it mean that the 
increase in imports, as stated by the Appellate Body in Argentina – Footwear, must 
be “recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause serious injury”?33 
What does “enough” mean, and to what must the increase of imports amount? 
What is the relative importance of each of the eight factors on which one must 
calculate whether there has been a serious injury? What exactly is the method by 
which one must reconstruct the causal link between increased imports and seri-
ous injury? And so on.
The obvious fear is that by weighting the burden of proof imposed on the coun-
try in need of protection in situations of economic difficulty, resorting to export-
restraint agreement might again be encouraged.
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34 See Negotiating Group on Safeguards, Meeting of 30 October, 1 and 2 November 1989, MTG.
GNG/NG9/13, 12 December 1989.
35 F. Wolfram, Art. 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards, in R. Wolfrum, P.T. Stoll, M. Koebele (eds.), 
WTO-Trade Remedies, Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law (Leiden, Boston, 2008), p. 375 
ff., at p. 386; Y.-S. Lee, Safeguard Measures in World Trade. The Legal Analysis (Leiden, The Hague, 
2005), p. 117, footnote 491, and p. 121.
36 P. Didier, WTO Trade Instruments in EU Law (London, 1999), p. 346.
37 S. Nüesch, Voluntary Export Restraints in WTO and EU Law (Bern, 2012), p. 280 ff.
4. Some Intrinsic and Extrinsic Limits of the Ban of “Grey Area” 
Measures: The Exclusion of Private Arrangements and  
the Problem of Its Enforceability
Apart from its exceptions – a subject that will be dealt with in the next 
paragraphs – perhaps the greatest weakness affecting the ban contained in Art. 11 
AS lies in the fact that it does not apply to “non-governmental measures”, i.e., 
arrangements concluded between private undertakings without any involvement 
of governmental or other kind of public authorities. The reason for this exclusion 
is that the WTO rules aim essentially to regulate the conduct of Member States. 
Export or import cartels or trade-disruptive industry-to-industry arrangements do 
not, therefore, come under the prohibition at issue here. This element is likely to 
stimulate a shift from public to private agreements concluded at an exclusive 
industry level.34
In this regard, the only relevant provision is enshrined in Art. 11.3 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, and prohibits States “to encourage or support the adop-
tion or maintenance by public and private enterprises of non-governmental mea-
sures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1”.
The real content of this obligation has become the subject of an interesting 
scholarly debate. For some authors, the duty not to encourage or support involves 
only a negative obligation of non facere.35 For others, however, it must be read as 
including also the obligation not to tolerate arrangements between private enter-
prises, and therefore a positive obligation of facere consisting, for instance, in the 
duty to enact and enforce domestic antitrust laws.36 This second view, mostly 
based on a teleological reading of the Agreement on Safeguards (which should be 
interpreted as aimed at avoiding any adverse effect on competition),37 seems to be 
contradicted by the text of Art. 11.3 AS and by the circumstance that the WTO does 
not yet regulate competition policies. Nothing in the Agreement on Safeguards, 
nor in any other WTO provision, may be read as imposing on Member States the 
duty to enact and implement domestic competition laws in order to impede pri-
vate VERs.
A second major problem – this time of an external nature – concerns the 
enforceability of the ban enshrined in Art. 11.1.b) AS. As is well known, the 
WTO dispute settlement system lacks any form of control “from above”, by 
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the organization (which has not been given the power to initiate proprio motu 
proceedings against its Members), or “from below”, by private operators. This is 
crucial, because the real losers from VERs are the consumers facing higher prices 
and fewer choices of the product in question. At international level, they are not 
entitled to lodge a direct complaint against a State that has concluded a WTO-
inconsistent export-restraint agreement. The only indirect avenue is provided by 
those administrative mechanisms, such as the US Section 301 and the EU Trade 
Barriers Regulation, according to which private parties play a triggering role, which 
however remain dependent on the will of the respective executive bodies to finally 
lodge a WTO complaint. At domestic level, then, the absence of direct effect of 
WTO rules in the legal order of the main users of these measures (EU, USA, 
Canada, Japan) stands in the way of the possibility for private parties to invoke the 
WTO-inconsistency of prohibited agreements before national courts.
Finally, the traditional problem of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs 
plays an important role in this field, creating powerful incentives to lobby for pro-
tectionist measures.
In sum, the only real opportunity to submit these measures to judicial control 
is left to the decision of WTO Member States, which however have never seemed 
very interested in following this path. Export-restraint agreements, in fact, consti-
tute a win-win situation, beneficial for both the importing and exporting coun-
tries. It is therefore highly unlikely that any of the contracting parties may find it 
convenient to bring a complaint before the WTO dispute settlement bodies to 
claim an illegality to which it has given its consent (volenti non fit iniuria). The only 
possibility that theoretically would remain open is a complaint filed by a third 
WTO Member suffering from an effect of trade-diversion induced by an export-
restraint agreement concluded between two other WTO Members. However, the 
circumstance that only on very rare occasions have GATT panels been called to 
pronounce themselves on these measures,38 and that so far no complaint has 
been brought to the WTO dispute settlement bodies in this field, demonstrates 
that WTO Member parties – apart from the difficulty of obtaining detailed infor-
mation on these agreement and demonstrating the existence of serious harm – 
have in turn preferred to conclude further arrangements to protect the competitive 
chances of their domestic industries.
The bottom line is that the circumstance that the judicial enforcement of WTO 
rules relies exclusively on complaints brought by its Members transforms the “grey 
area” into a “safe area”, in which illegal behaviour is not easy to detect.39
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44 Ibid., p. 296.
Several proposals have been put forward to remedy this situation. They range 
from the establishment of a “WTO attorney general”,40 to granting private parties 
and NGOs the right to participate in WTO proceedings by notifying the existence 
of grey area measures,41 to the revitalization of the surveillance role of the 
Committee of Safeguards, that should closely monitor the implementation of the 
ban contained in Art. 11 and report any suspected violation to the Council for 
Trade in Goods.42
5. The Persistent Use of Export-Restraint Agreements Falling  
within the Exceptions to the Ban Provided by Art. 11. 1. c) AS: The Case  
of the Protocol of Accession of China and the Agreement Restricting 
the Export of Chinese Textiles
In a sense, the emergence of “grey area” measures is a by-product of the accession 
of Japan to the GATT, in 1955. At that time, many industrialized countries feared 
that Japanese manufactured goods produced at much lower costs (and thus sold 
at a much more competitive price) could flood their markets. This led many gov-
ernments (especially those of European countries) to initially oppose the acces-
sion of Japan. In fact, the widespread belief was that the safeguard clause enshrined 
in Art. XIX GATT was totally inadequate to cope with that situation, because it did 
not lend itself to a discriminatory application directed exclusively towards 
Japanese products. An attempt was made to obtain a special safeguard, derogating 
to Art. XIX GATT, but no concrete result was achieved.43 The result was that Japan 
acceded to the GATT in September 1955, and that 14 Member Countries (which 
accounted for 40% of the volume of Japanese exports) invoked Art. XXXV GATT to 
prevent the application of GATT rules in their relationships with the new Member. 
To induce some of these countries to modify their decision, the Japanese authori-
ties showed that they were willing to extend to relations with these States the 
practice of voluntary agreement limiting exports, already begun with the United 
States in 1957. In the mid-60s, Japan had concluded agreements of this kind with 
twenty countries.44 A special safeguard measure affecting a single industrial 
sector – cotton textiles – was incorporated firstly in the Short-Term Agreement of 
1961, then replaced in 1962 by the Long-Term Agreement, and finally in 1974 in the 
Multifibre Agreement, a veritable “factory” of grey area measures. Export-restraint 
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agreements were negotiated also to curb exports from other developing countries, 
like Pakistan, India and Hong Kong.
Nearly a century later, a similar problem arose in anticipation of China’s acces-
sion to the WTO (accession that took place in November 2001). This time it was 
immediately decided to set up a special system of safeguards, that also provides 
for measures limiting exports. To this end, one of the exceptions that Art. 11.1 c) AS 
imposes on the ban of measures limiting exports turned out to be useful. Under 
this provision, in fact “The Agreement does not apply to measures sought, taken or 
maintained by a Member pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article 
XIX, and Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex IA other than this Agreement, 
or pursuant to protocols and agreements or arrangements concluded within the 
framework of GATT 1994” (emphasis added). Among the protocols whose conclu-
sion is provided for by Art. XXXIII GATT, there are those through which the gov-
ernment of a third country negotiates the terms of its accession to the General 
Agreement. Today, as accession is no longer only to the GATT but to the whole 
package of agreements administered by the WTO, the procedure is also regu-
lated under Art. XII of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. This rule confirms 
that accession takes place “on terms to be agreed” between the WTO and the 
acceding State.
Well, Art. 16 of the Protocol laying down the conditions for the accession of the 
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China) creates a transitional safeguard 
mechanism that applies only to the products of that country (exactly what was 
sought, and not achieved, at the time of the accession of Japan), and operates for 
a period of twelve years from the date of China’s accession (until the end of 2013).45 
This special mechanism differs from the common discipline, enshrined in Art. XIX 
GATT and in the Agreement on Safeguards, in numerous respects. They concern, 
inter alia, the extent of the injury (which must not be “serious”, but only cause a 
market disruption, and thus only “material”), the possibility of resorting to coun-
termeasures by China (which is forbidden for two years, even in the case of rela-
tive increases in imports), and the duration of safeguard measures (which is not 
determined).46 For our purposes, however, the most characteristic point of the 
“Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism” is governed by Art. 16.2 of 
the Protocol of Accession. Under this provision “If in the course of these bilateral 
consultations, it is agreed that imports of Chinese origin are such a cause and that 
action is necessary, China shall take such action as to prevent or remedy the market 
disruption” (emphasis added), which is equivalent to a rather unveiled call for the 
adoption of measures aiming to restrict imports. But there is more.
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In addition to the transitional safeguard mechanism just analysed, the negotia-
tions that preceded the accession of China produced another safeguard mecha-
nism, which might be labelled “super-special”, as it affects not only Chinese 
products, but only one category of products (textiles). This mechanism is gov-
erned by Art. 242 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China47 
(whose terms and conditions are part of the Protocol of Accession, an instrument 
which, in turn, becomes part of the WTO agreements after its ratification by the 
applicant State). It remained formally in force until 31st December, 2008.
The reason behind the introduction of this additional safeguard measure lies in 
the gradual phasing out of quotas on textiles under the Multifibre Agreement. It is 
widely known that with the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 
the Multifibre Agreement was replaced and superseded by the WTO Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing, with the objective of a gradual reintegration of the rela-
tive sector within the multilateral trade regime. After ten years, the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing ceased to be in force (on January 2005). After the expiry of 
the transitional regime governed by this Agreement, all the quotas previously in 
force ceased to have effect, so that Chinese textiles encountered no obstacle in 
invading the markets of most industrialized countries. To pave the way for a tran-
sition as smooth as possible, at the beginning of 2005, China adopted some “vol-
untary” measures of export restrictions. The failure of this solution, however, 
pushed to activate the means that had been prudently set up in the Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of China. In short, Art. 242 of the Report creates a 
mechanism of consultations within which “Every effort would be made to reach 
agreement on a mutually satisfactory solution…”. However, already upon receipt 
of the request for consultations, China automatically undertakes to limit its 
exports to a level not exceeding 7.5% (that becomes 6% for wool products) of the 
amount of exports recorded in the 12 months preceding the request for consulta-
tions. In itself, this measure already shows the distinctive features of export-
restraint agreements.
It was then the practice to take charge of clarifying what was meant by consul-
tations aimed at reaching a “mutually satisfactory solution” that can reduce or 
avoid market disruption. On June 11, 2005, in fact, the European Union and China 
concluded a Memorandum of Understanding48 providing for the imposition of 
export quotas on ten categories of Chinese textiles, whose duration was extended 
until the end of 2007.49 In August 2005, the maximum quota established for some 
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products was quickly reached, a situation that caused an embargo on the clear-
ance of Chinese textiles, which remained stowed in the warehouses of European 
ports. To allow for clearance, on 5th September 2005, the parties agreed on some 
transitional measures of flexibility regarding the implementation of the previous 
agreement.50
The same route was followed by the United States. Following a traditional 
pattern of conduct, this country aggressively invoked trade defence instruments 
to put pressure on China and push the conclusion of an overall agreement.51 
On 8th November 2005, the United States and China stipulated a Memorandum 
of Understanding concerning trade in textiles and clothing.52 The agreement 
imposed export restrictions on 21 categories of Chinese textile products with 
effect from 1 January 2006 until 31 December 2008.
Thus, from the time of its accession to the WTO and until the dates of expiry of 
the measures analysed, China has been subject to a system of safeguards (doubly) 
special, highly divergent compared to that commonly in effect. This regime allows 
the use of agreements limiting exports, taking advantage of one of the exceptions 
to the prohibition of “grey area” measures enshrined in Art. 11.1 c) AS. Under Art. 
41.1.a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties this is, therefore, a hypoth-
esis in which the inter se agreement is “provided for” by the multilateral treaty. In 
this regard, however, there is something important to be noted.
In the legal scholarship,53 in fact, it has been observed that in cases in which the 
inter se agreements are provided for by the general agreement, they should be 
considered “by definition” compatible with the object and purpose of the multilat-
eral treaty as a whole. That is, by virtue of a sort of parallelism with the hypothesis 
disciplined sub Art. 41. 1.b), i.e., one in which the modification is neither provided 
for nor prohibited, and therefore must comply with the object and purpose of 
the general agreement as a whole (as well as with other parties’ rights) to be con-
sidered lawful. To confirm this, mention is often made of some treaty-provisions 
(for example, Art. 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, or Art. 31 of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) which allow the conclusion of further 
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agreements, but only on condition that they fulfil the object and purpose of the 
multilateral treaty and /or its fundamental principles.
Reverting now to our subject, it is evident that the hypothesis just mentioned 
does not occur in the case of agreements limiting exports whose conclusion is 
provided or allowed by the Protocol of Accession of China to the WTO, and there-
fore allowed under Art. 11.1.c) AS. These agreements, in fact, for reasons given 
above (see para. 2), are certainly at odds with fundamental principles and the 
object of the multilateral trading system. And this is perhaps the most interesting 
element, because it shows that a legal system can end up allowing exemptions to 
its core principles to absorb a potential situation of systemic crisis (as was the 
entry into the WTO of a commercial “giant” like China).
On the other hand, the story of the special safeguard regime transiently 
prepared for Chinese products – especially when viewed within the broader 
context of the so-called WTO-plus obligations accepted, in some cases perma-
nently, by China54 – highlights how fragmentation is not so much (or only, if one 
prefers) a contradiction that the WTO raises vis-à-vis the international legal order 
taken as a whole, but an internal dynamics of the multilateral trade legal sub- 
system. Moreover, as has been openly advocated by some Member States of the 
WTO, the fact that according to Art. XII of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, 
the conditions of accession should be negotiated case by case, and without 
any defined limit or condition, means that “the acceding governments do not 
have the automatic right to the treatment laid down in the WTO Agreements 
for original Members of the WTO”.55 An assertion that seems to contradict 
those views according to which “WTO obligations are always the same for all 
Members”.56
Obviously, one could observe that the WTO system provides for the principle 
of preferential and differentiated treatment. This treatment, however, is designed 
to help developing countries, so as to achieve one of the objectives stated in 
the Preamble to the Agreement establishing the WTO (“… to ensure that develop-
ing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their 
economic development”). The agreements imposing restrictions on exports 
from China as the price of its entry into the WTO seem, however, to pursue the 
contrary aim.
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6. The Persistent Use of Export-Restraint Agreements Falling Outside 
the Scope of Exceptions to the Ban Provided by Art. 11. 1. c) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards: The Steel Agreements
Reiterating provisions already existing in the Codes adopted under the Tokyo 
Round, Art. 18 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(hereinafter ASCM), and Art. 8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (i.e., the Agree-
ment on Implementation of Art. VI of the GATT 1994 – hereinafter ADA) establish 
that the procedures of investigation may be suspended or terminated without the 
imposition of provisional measures or countervailing/anti-dumping duties “upon 
receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings”.
In the case of subsidies – which are measures attributable to States – the under-
takings in question may be assumed by the government of the exporting Member 
as well as by private exporters (in this latter case, the consent of the exporting 
WTO Member is required under Art. 18.2 ASCM). In the first hypothesis: “the gov-
ernment of the exporting Member agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take 
other measures concerning its effects” (emphasis added); in the second: “the 
exporter agrees to revise its prices so that the investigating authorities are satisfied 
that the injurious effect of the subsidy is eliminated…”.
On the other hand, in the case of anti-dumping proceedings, Art. 8.1 ADA pro-
vides that the undertakings may be adopted exclusively “from any exporter to 
revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so 
that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is elimi-
nated”. When the undertaking is assumed directly by private exporters, thus, it 
aims essentially to increase the prices of exported goods in order to curb the quan-
tity of exports.
Both hypotheses just mentioned are covered by the general clause of exception 
to the ban of export-restraint agreements enshrined in Art. 11.1.c) AS, as this clause 
covers all the measures that are authorized by the agreements listed in Annex 1A 
(and therefore also by the Agreements on Subsidies and Anti-Dumping).
The role played by these exceptions is particularly relevant. Traditionally, and 
also during the current economic crisis (as we have already seen), the adoption of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties is much more frequent than the activa-
tion of safeguard measures. The choice of countervailing duties and anti-dumping 
measures in lieu of safeguard measures (a sort of “regime shopping”), in fact, has 
certain advantages: selectivity, absence of authorized retaliation (because one 
defends itself against unfair or illegal practices), a lower threshold of harm to be 
proved (“material”, and not “serious” injury). One must add to this the possibility 
of legally entering into export-restraint arrangements, provided that certain con-
ditions are met. As already anticipated,57 the risk is that the ban on “grey area” 
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measures contained in the Agreement on Safeguards could push more trade fric-
tions in the area of anti-dumping and countervailing measures, to the detriment 
of the exporting countries.
This forecast seems to have actually been translated into reality.
In recent years, in fact, both the United States and the European Union 
have concluded bilateral agreements on steel products involving “grey area” 
measures.58
In 1998, for example, the U.S. authorities initiated countervailing duties investi-
gations to determine whether Brazilian exports of certain hot-rolled flat-rolled 
carbon quality steel products received subsidies. On 7th July 1999, under threat of 
the imminent imposition of countervailing duties, Brazil signed an agreement 
with the United States to suspend the investigation.59 Brazil undertook not to pro-
vide new or additional export or import substitution subsidies on steel products 
(Art. III), and to restrict the volume of direct or indirect exports to the United 
States (Art. IV). Moreover, the agreement included systems for export license 
(Art. V), and monitoring (Art. VII). This agreement was terminated in September 
2004. In addition to the countervailing duty suspension agreement, the U.S. 
and Brazil also concluded an anti-dumping suspension agreement involving a 
minimum import price imposed on Brazil (agreement terminated in February 
2002).60
The question here arises of whether the U.S.-Brazil agreement falls within the 
exceptions to the ban of “grey area” measures mentioned at the beginning of this 
paragraph. The answer tends to be in the negative,61 because Art. 18 ASCM pro-
vides for three distinct possibilities when it allows the suspension or termination 
of proceedings on the basis of voluntary undertakings under which the govern-
ment of an exporting Member agrees “to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take 
other measures concerning its effects” (emphasis added). In other words, the 
possibility of undertaking these obligations cumulatively seems to be clearly 
excluded.62 Brazil had already agreed to eliminate the subsidies, so that there was 
no need to take additional measures, such as export quotas, concerning the effect 
of the subsidized exports.
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Another case in point is the U.S.-China steel agreement. On 24 October 1997, 
following anti-dumping investigations by the U.S. with respect to cut-to-length 
carbon steel from China, the two governments signed an anti-dumping investiga-
tion suspension agreement,63 which continued to be in force until 2002 (after 
China’s accession to the WTO) and was then extended until November 2003.64 
This agreement provided for quantitative restrictions of Chinese exports to the 
U.S. of steel exports (Art. III). Further, it included a reference price mechanism 
(Art. IV), and export licenses (Art. V). According to paragraph 17 of the Protocol on 
China’s accession to the WTO “All prohibitions, quantitative restrictions and other 
measures maintained by WTO Members against imports from China in a manner 
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement are listed in Annex 7. All such prohibitions, 
quantitative restrictions and other measures shall be phased out or dealt with in 
accordance with mutually agreed terms and timetables as specified in the said 
Annex”. Unfortunately, the United States have not specified any reservation in any 
commodity in Annex 7 to the China’s Protocol of Accession. Therefore the quanti-
tative restrictions maintained after the accession of China are discriminatory and 
in violation of article I and XIII of the GATT.
As for the EC, the authorities in Bruxelles signed two bilateral agreements on 
steel with Macedonia in 2002, and with Moldova in 2004, to double-check. The 
Agreement with Moldova65 does not involve quantitative restrictions, but pro-
vides for surveillance and export license documentation, measures that fall within 
the illustrative list of prohibited “grey area” measures contained in footnote 4 to 
Art. 11.1.b) AS.
7. (Sequitur): The 1996 and 2006 Agreements between the  
U.S. and Canada on Softwood Lumber
The trade dispute on softwood lumber that, since 1982, opposes the United States 
and Canada may be regarded as an example of regime shopping. In fact, a case 
substantially involving the detrimental increase in the volume of imports of 
Canadian lumber in the United States, that could have naturally been addressed in 
the context of the safeguard measures provided for by Art. XIX GATT, has been 
strategically tackled by the U.S. authorities primarily as a problem of subsidies 
granted to producers of softwood lumber from Canadian authorities, and then 
as a case of dumped sales by the producers themselves.66 In this regard, the 
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traditional accusation by the U.S. against Canada is that the charges that produc-
ers pay directly to the Canadian provinces (since the land is publicly owned) to cut 
down the trees are artificially lower than the market value (in particular with com-
parison to what is paid by U.S. producers that cut wood on private land). That 
would produce a de facto subsidiarization effect to the benefit of Canadian 
producers.
Against this background, agreements restricting the exports of Canadian soft-
wood lumber in the United States were concluded in 1996 and 2006. Even here, 
then, the problem arises whether these measures could be considered as legally 
adopted in the light of the exception contained in Art. 11. 1 c) AS, referring this 
time to Articles 8 ADA and 18 ASCM.
More specifically, Art. II of the Softwood Lumber Agreement concluded between 
the United States and Canada in May 199667 provided for the establishment by the 
Canadian authorities of a system of export permits (one of the “grey area” mea-
sures illustratively listed in the Agreement on Safeguards). Granting these permits 
became subject to the payment of a fee when the amount of softwood lumber 
exported to the U.S. market exceeded a certain annual amount. In return, the 
United States undertook not to initiate any trade action against the imports of 
Canadian softwood lumber. The imposition of export restraints by way of export 
fees was clearly intended to cause an increase in prices and, therefore, a restriction 
to the amount of Canadian lumber exported to the U.S. market. The Agreement 
was not notified to the Committee on Safeguards, and, in any case, it remained in 
force until March 2001, past the deadline by which all existing grey-area measures 
had to be phased out.
A few days after the expiry of the Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S. lumber 
producers’ associations readily reactivated internal procedures of investigations. 
The result was the start of the fourth stage of the dispute, during which Canada 
brought complaints before the WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement bodies, and 
before U.S. Courts against the proceedings and the anti-dumping/countervailing 
duties imposed by the U.S. authorities.68 This stage of the dispute culminated on 
12 September 2006 in the conclusion of a further agreement between the United 
States and Canada. This time, the agreement was notified to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body under Art. 3.6 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, as a 
“mutually agreed solution”.69 The 2006 Agreement, which is expected to last seven 
years, establish that the U.S. will phase out countervailing and anti-dumping 
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duties that have been applied since May 2002 against Canadian lumber export. In 
addition, the U.S. undertook to return to the Canadian authorities the amount of 
collected duties kept under deposit, along with the commitment not to start new 
investigations for the duration of the Agreement (Articles III, IV and V, respec-
tively). In return, the Canadian authorities undertook to implement a dual mecha-
nism in order to restrict their exports of lumber to the United States (Art. VII). The 
Canadian provinces that choose option A are required to impose a tax on exports, 
whose value increases with the decrease of the price of lumber sold in the U.S. 
market. The provinces that, instead, choose option B, in addition to a lower tax, 
have to impose a quota on the maximum quantity of lumber that can be exported. 
Both the amount of the tax and of the quota obviously increases with the decreas-
ing price of lumber in the U.S. market, so as to counteract the alleged effect of 
price decline caused by subsidies or dumped prices, and thus render the exported 
product less competitive.
Such agreement does not appear to fall squarely within the scope of Articles 8 
ADA and/or Art. 18 ASCM. Indeed, the purpose of these provisions is to create a 
third alternative to the two traditional outcomes that investigations on trade 
defence measures can usually reach.70 Beyond the rejection or, rather, the accep-
tance of a demand for duties, in fact, the possibility is added to suspend or termi-
nate the relative investigation as a consequence of the giving and acceptance of 
voluntary undertakings, without the application of provisional measures and duties. 
In the case at issue here, however, definitive duties had been levied and collected 
for over four years, to the point that the U.S. authorities undertook in 2006 to 
phase them out and to return a part of them to Canada. In addition, Art. 8 ADA 
provides for the conclusion of agreements only between the importing State and 
private exporters, not between WTO Member States (as may happen, instead, in 
the case of subsidies).
This assessment would be different if, as some authors have maintained,71 the 
two provisions at issue here would implicitly allow the parties to settle the dispute 
through export-restraint arrangements at any time. This view cannot be shared,72 
given the fact that exceptions have to be interpreted restrictively, and that no pre-
cise legal basis supporting this opinion is offered. Quite the contrary, the footnote 
contained in Articles 8.1 ADA and 18.1 ASCM makes it clear that there is no possi-
bility of “the simultaneous continuation of proceedings with the implementation 
of price undertakings” or “… with the implementation of undertakings”, which 
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may be taken to confirm that the acceptance of an undertaking and the imposi-
tion of duties are alternative solutions.
If the above is true, then also the condition laid down in Art. 3.5 DSU – under 
which all mutually agreed solutions (the 2006 agreement was notified precisely in 
this capacity) must be respectful of the WTO Agreements – is not fulfilled. Here, 
therefore, we are faced with an agreement that is prohibited under the WTO legal 
system (once the exception has been discarded, in fact, the general ban comes 
back into force). Moreover, like all agreements restricting exports, it collides with 
the object of the GATT/WTO legal system as a whole. An agreement that, there-
fore, does not meet two of the three requirements enshrined in Article 41.1.b) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Given that the consequence of an 
inter se agreement not fulfilling the conditions provided herein must be recon-
structed in terms of responsibility towards the other parties of the general treaty, 
and not of invalidity, it is of great importance that no other WTO Member is 
reported to have raised any objection to the legality of the agreement in question 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
8. Summary and Concluding Remarks
After having defined “grey area” measures and given a brief account of the reasons 
for their proliferation under the GATT 1947 (reasons linked, inter alia, to the “fail-
ure” of the general safeguard clause under Art. XIX GATT), this work has examined 
the dual strategy through which the WTO Agreement on Safeguards intended to 
reintegrate these measures within the WTO system of legality (by forbidding 
export-restraint agreement, on the one hand, and trying to revive legal safeguards 
on the other). According to several authors, the achievement of this goal is cur-
rently frustrated by the overly restrictive attitude adopted by the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies. Moreover, by imposing the ban of export-restraint agreements, 
the Uruguay Round negotiators have provided exceptions whose scope – as has 
been demonstrated by China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO in 2001 – have 
turned out to be very broad. Exceptions that still leave open the possibility for 
Member States to restrict exports through voluntary undertakings taken as a con-
sequence of investigations concerning trade defence measures. Finally, even if 
none of the exceptions provided for by Art. 11.1.c) AS is present, theoretically WTO 
Members could still play one last card: to conclude inter se agreements that, 
although in contrast with the multilateral discipline, remain valid even if they can 
give rise to international responsibility. A responsibility that other States seem to 
be rather unwilling to claim (as confirmed by the silent reaction to the 2006 
Agreement between the United States and Canada on softwood lumber).
In a broader perspective, the topic examined in this work shows that the regula-
tion of trade relations can vary depending on the pair of WTO Member States 
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participating in a legal relationship. This potential fragmentation of the multilat-
eral legal framework governing international trade may be as much the result of 
agreements restricting exports authorized by the system, as the result of conven-
tional solutions that are neither permitted nor permissible under Art. 41 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, yet are still largely tolerated. In this 
respect there can be more than a doubt on the existence of a qualitative distance 
from the GATT à la carte,73 i.e., that mosaic of special schemes, exemptions and 
side-agreements that the creation of the WTO was intended to replace.
